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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
REGULATORY COHERENCE IN TTIP: AN
EU PERSPECTIVE
ANNE MEUWESE*
I
INTRODUCTION
Regulatory cooperation is far from new, and the transatlantic variety in
1
particular has long been at the forefront of its development. Approaching
regulatory cooperation as an effort solely to harmonize or mutually recognize
existing rules risks foregoing learning opportunities that cooperation provides
2
through variation across legal systems. With the need to adopt a dynamic
3
approach to trade agreements comes proceduralization of bilateral regulatory
cooperation: not the rules themselves, but the procedures for producing them,
become the object of cooperation. The compatibility of domestic structures for
producing rules and regulation becomes crucial to the success of regulatory
4
cooperation as a pathway to further economic integration. Contemporary
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1. See generally TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Mark A. Pollack
& Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001); TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS
AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter PROBLEMS]; George
A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation between the European Commission and U.S. Administrative
Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 933 (1996); Giandomenico Majone, International Regulatory
Cooperation: A Neo-Institutionalist Approach, in PROBLEMS, supra; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Globalization and Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Proposals for EU–U.S. Initiatives to Further
Constitutionalize International Law, in PROBLEMS, supra.
2. See generally Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International
Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
3. See, e.g., Boris Rigod, Trade in Goods under the Korea–EU FTA: Market Access and
Regulatory Measures, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SOUTH KOREA: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
STRENGTHENING TRADE, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS 86 (James Harrison ed., 2013)
(analyzing the EU–Korea free trade agreement as an example of a “living instrument” with provisions
for cooperation and consultations by committees and working groups functioning as an in-built
mechanism for filling lacunae in domestic regulation).
4. See Susanne Lütz, Back to the Future? The Domestic Sources of Transatlantic Regulation, 18
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) iii (2011) (mapping the domestic factors that hamper
cooperation or conflict in transatlantic regulation); Kai Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 57
(2002) (analyzing the role of “agency-to-agency cooperation” addressing domestic rules as a vehicle for
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regulatory cooperation efforts in trade contexts are increasingly focused on
minimizing future regulatory barriers through joint procedures in order to avoid
freezing in time the results of regulatory trade agreements. Recent efforts to
advance transatlantic regulatory cooperation have taken this procedural
approach to the next level, as evidenced by the draft textual proposals for the
regulatory coherence chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) agreement, an envisaged free trade agreement being
negotiated between the United States and the European Union (EU). It
appears that TTIP will lean on the idea of a permanent bilateral regulatory
5
cooperation mechanism.
TTIP is not the first attempt at mutually streamlining procedures for the
creation of regulation as a way to reduce regulatory barriers between the
6
United States and the EU. Negotiation texts published by the European
Commission (EC) reveal some novel mechanisms being proposed for inclusion
in TTIP, however. Instead of the usual joint-consultation forums, such as the
Transatlantic Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue, the idea is to establish a
Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB) composed of senior regulators from both
sides that prepares annual regulatory coordination programs. Another proposal
concerns the establishment of sectoral working groups that will conceivably
7
study the trade impact of more technical regulation in detail. Rather than being
8
viewed as a barrier to transatlantic regulatory cooperation, as it was in the past,
governance is now seen as a gateway to it. This may be due to the view that this
9
“mega-regional” agreement would not be accepted by the European
Parliament without deferring decisions on controversial regulatory issues, which
is what many provisions in the regulatory coherence chapter will effectively do.
At a time when many feel uncomfortable with the influence that
regulatory cooperation).
5. Article 8 of the EU negotiation text for the horizontal chapter of TTIP states, “The Parties
hereby establish a bilateral mechanism . . . . ” European Commission, TTIP–Initial Provisions for
CHAPTER [ ] – Regulatory Cooperation, May 4, 2015 [hereinafter Initial Provisions]. On February 10,
2015, the European Commission made public several negotiation texts that were tabled for discussion
with the United States in the negotiating round of February 2–6, 2015. On May 4, 2015 a slightly
updated version was published on the website of DG Trade. These texts come with the disclaimer that
“[t]he actual text in the final agreement will be a result of negotiations between the EU and US.” Id.
6. See generally Anne Meuwese, EU–U.S. Horizontal Regulatory Cooperation: Mutual
Recognition of Impact Assessment?, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: THE
SHIFTING ROLES OF THE EU, THE US AND CALIFORNIA (David Vogel & Johan F.M. Swinnen eds.,
2011) (detailing earlier attempts to convergence on rulemaking procedures and impact assessment
specifically).
7. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, art. 14(4) at 14.
8. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, US and EU Structures of Governance as Barriers to
Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, in PROBLEMS, supra note 1 (providing, with special attention to
banking regulation, an overview of the potential obstacles that structures of governance in both Europe
and the United States may pose to regulatory cooperation); DAVID VOGEL, BARRIERS OR BENEFITS?
REGULATION IN TRANSATLANTIC TRADE (1997) (detailing sector-specific barriers to transatlantic
trade, including governance-related ones such as inspection requirements).
9. Polly Botsford, Global Free Trade in the 21st Century, IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT, Aug.–Sept.,
2014, at 16.
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10

international norms have on their domestic legal systems, the problems
regulatory cooperation poses for democratic legitimacy are being widely and
openly debated—in academia, in the antiglobalization movement, and within a
11
variety of institutions. These debates on regulatory cooperation center on the
fear that regulatory coherence will amount to lower standards in the EU and
will give lobbying groups more influence over the content of regulation at the
expense of democratic and accountable institutions. However, stakeholders and
politicians rarely phrase their concerns in constitutional terms, which means
that potential protections or solutions stemming from concrete treaty
provisions, principles, and case law may easily be overlooked.
This article aims to address that lacuna. It suggests that regulatory
cooperation—certainly horizontal regulatory cooperation, or cooperative
endeavors that go beyond approximation of concrete rules and even specific
sectors—is not solely an international law issue but also a matter of
12
constitutional law. The main constitutional concerns can be grouped under two
headings: (1) regulatory sovereignty, which refers to the right of sovereign
entities to regulate as they see fit, and (2) democratic legitimacy, which refers to
the idea that regulations should be promulgated by institutions accountable to
voters. These worries might be aligned but need not be, because the first
category assumes that too many constraints may arise on the part of domestic
regulators whereas the second category hypothesizes that the production of
binding rules, as it is being influenced by cooperative regulatory efforts, may
face too few of these constraints.
What makes regulatory cooperation a particularly salient constitutional
problem is that insider–outsider demarcations have become fluid. The
constituents and regulated parties within the legal system whose representatives
are entering into regulatory cooperation agreements may be confronted with a
loss of sovereignty and democratic accountability through those agreements.
The agreements may also provide an opportunity, however, to set boundaries as
to the sort of regulatory authority that may be deployed in regulatory
cooperation settings and to transfer certain substantive and procedural
preferences to a different legal system—an opportunity that is unavailable to
stakeholders in “third countries,” who are affected by the outcomes of
regulatory cooperation but are not parties to the negotiations.
Some constitutional limits are clear-cut. Provisions in international
agreements such as TTIP cannot create any new law-making or rule-making
institutions, nor can they endow existing institutions with new law-making
powers. At the same time, the United States and the EU would not bother with
10. Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, When Structures Become Shackles:
Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 740 (2014).
11. Factsheet, European Comm’n, Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153002.1%20RegCo.pdf.
12. See Petersmann, supra note 1, at 616. The two are intertwined. See generally Joris Larik,
Shaping the International Order as a Union Objective and the Dynamic Internationalisation of
Constitutional Law (Center for the Law of EU External Relations, Working Paper No. 2011/5, 2011).

MEUWESE_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE)

156

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

1/14/2016 1:25 PM

[Vol. 78:153

an entire chapter on regulatory coherence, which consists of joint principles and
procedures for cooperation, if the provisions were not expected to have effects
on rulemaking or lawmaking, on both sides of the Atlantic. This article
addresses the constitutional aspects of regulatory cooperation in two distinct
analyses because the dynamic that lies behind the seemingly technical
provisions from the proposed regulatory coherence chapter of TTIP is difficult
to capture. First, this article discusses the constitutional implications of
horizontal regulatory cooperation under TTIP. Mapping where the effects of
horizontal regulatory cooperation are likely to be felt sheds light on the sort of
constitutional limitations at play. Second, the article canvasses the
constitutional limitations that arise from the EU treaties and the case law. Each
of these two exercises is carried out for both the issue of regulatory sovereignty
and the issue of democratic accountability. Although the underlying
constitutional concerns apply to regulatory cooperation involving the EU
13
generally, the propositions in the negotiation texts of the TTIP regulatory
coherence chapter are used for reference. Concrete institutional propositions—
14
even if they have not yet been enacted—bring the concerns into sharper focus.
Comparisons to the institutional context in the United States will crystalize
these concerns related to the European constitutional aspects of horizontal
15
regulatory cooperation. The conclusion ultimately takes stock and identifies
some opportunities for the development of the constitutional regulation of
regulatory coherence in TTIP.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATORY COHERENCE IN TTIP
An explanatory text on the proposed regulatory coherence chapter from the
European Commission contains the promise that “[t]he agreement will not

13. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 1.
[G]iven that the provisions of this Chapter concern predominantly procedures for
cooperation, they may not lend themselves to the application of dispute settlement rules.
Alternative mechanisms for ensuring proper application could be explored . . . . As regards the
sectoral provisions of the TTIP regulatory cluster, further reflection will be required as
regards the most appropriate mechanisms of ensuring proper application.
Id.
14. Although important constitutional questions also arise from the Investor–State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) debate, the scope of this article is limited to horizontal regulatory cooperation,
which is not expected to fall under ISDS. This is not to say that ISDS, if included, will have no effects
on regulation, but the provisions in the regulatory coherence chapter are unlikely to be enforced
through this dispute resolution channel.
15. Two extensive comparisons of the two legislative and regulatory systems have recently been
made available to the public. See generally RICHARD PARKER & ALBERTO ALEMANNO, CENTRE FOR
EUROPEAN POL’Y STUD., NO. 88, TOWARDS EFFECTIVE REGULATORY COOPERATION UNDER TTIP:
A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE EU AND US LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY SYSTEMS (2014);
Susan E. Dudley & Kai Wegrich, Achieving Regulatory Policy Objectives: An Overview and
Comparison of U.S. and EU Procedures (Geo. Wash. Reg. Stud. Working Paper, March 2015),
http://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/
Dudley%20Wegrich_US-EU_RegOverview_20150506_Rev.pdf.
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change the principles and the procedures set out in the EU treaties defining
16
how our regulations should be made.” This reassurance prompts the question:
Presuming that the lengthy negotiations are not for nothing, what will TTIP
change, then? And, should the regulatory coherence chapter in TTIP be
adopted, who will exercise what degree of influence over substantive regulatory
outcomes? The following discussion of regulatory sovereignty addresses the
scope of the intended regulatory coherence chapter, regulatory principles,
regulatory analysis, and the idea for a “Regulatory Cooperation Body.” Then,
the discussion of democratic accountability addresses democratic control and
institutional balance, multilevel aspects, and transparency and participation.
A. Implications for Regulatory Sovereignty
17

International trade law inevitably limits EU decisionmaking. But is there
anything in the regulatory coherence plans for TTIP that would prohibit EU
institutions from adopting certain types of regulations or that would compel
them to adopt others?
1. Scope
One clue regarding the envisaged hierarchy between agreements on specific
rules and sectors and horizontal agreements regarding procedures may be
found in the EC’s proposal to include a clause stipulating that “[i]n case of any
inconsistency between the provisions of this Chapter and the provisions laid
down in [specific or sectoral provisions concerning goods and services, to be
18
identified], the latter shall prevail.” This provision clarifies that agreements on
procedures flowing from the regulatory coherence chapter are secondary. Yet
because the scope of applicability of this latter chapter is potentially very wide,
the horizontal provisions on regulatory cooperation may have far-reaching
effects on the content of regulations of various formal status.
The EU’s Report of the Eighth Round of Negotiations for TTIP reveals that
one point of disagreement between the EU and the United States concerns the
19
scope of the regulatory coherence chapter. What type of law-making
procedures are to be affected by approximation efforts? The United States

16. EUROPEAN COMM’N, TTIP AND REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW 7 (2015) [hereinafter
OVERVIEW], http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153121.1.2%20TTIP% 20and
%20regulation%20overview.pdf.
17. See Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, The Impact of the WTO on EU Decision-making, in
THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 29–30 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne
Scott eds., 2003) (tracing the impact of WTO norms on EU governance and policymaking).
18. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 4 (alterations in original).
19. See Report of the Eighth Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (Brussels, 2–6 February 2015), at 4 (Mar. 5, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2015/february/tradoc_153175.pdf. This document reveals that when the EU negotiating team
presented its draft proposal for a regulatory coherence chapter, it also reiterated its earlier concerns
regarding the imbalance of the U.S. proposal, which allegedly sought to include only federal
rulemaking on the U.S. side although including both EU and Member State legislation and regulations
in its scope on the EU side.
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seeks to include only federal agency rulemaking, whereas the EU thinks this
limited inclusion amounts to an imbalance. If, on the EU side, legislative acts—
rules that require the approval of the European Parliament and the Council—
are to be included, a larger share of its rules would fall under the regulatory
coherence chapter than is the case for the United States. If the United States
gets its way, the EU and member-state legislation and regulations would fall
under the scope of the horizontal provisions of the regulatory coherence
chapter. The EU proposes this too, adding the clarification that only central
government authorities at the member-state level should be covered, not local
20
authorities, for instance. It is uncertain what the EC’s position on the EU
scope will be if the inclusion of federal statutes on the U.S. side does not make
it to the final agreement.
As is apparent from the EU–U.S. disagreement on this point, the issue of
the breadth of regulatory coherence is thorny. On one hand, a final treaty that
includes federal statutes of the United States seems unlikely. The way in which
the U.S. Congress goes about lawmaking is too far removed from the process
assumed by the proposed provisions. Who would seriously expect Congress to
start carrying out impact analyses as U.S. agencies do by way of compensation
for its lack of direct democratic accountability in setting rules? On the other
hand, what on its face appears to be a reasonable solution—the exclusion of EU
legislation and legislative acts—in reality is quite unreasonable. Much of the
EU primary legislation is regulatory; that is, prescriptive and detailed in nature.
This is not surprising given that EU supranational lawmaking can be conceived
of as a type of delegation, with the member states as principals and the EU
institutions as agents. Finally, opting for a substantive criterion only, such as all
measures of general application affecting goods and services with significant
21
transatlantic impact, would make the provisions very difficult to enforce even
if a strong role were given to a Regulatory Cooperation Body, because
significant transatlantic impact is a matter of degree and this will normally only
become apparent once the rules are in force.
2. Regulatory Principles
The draft preamble from the EU negotiation text states in part, “The Parties
having regard to the importance of regulation to achieve public policy
objectives, and their right to regulate and adopt measures to ensure that these
objectives are protected at the level that each Party considers appropriate, in
22
line with its respective principles.” Similarly, in the proposed Article 1(d)(3) a
guarantee is in place that horizontal regulatory cooperation under TTIP will not
restrict the right of each side to maintain, adopt, and apply measures to achieve
legitimate public policy objectives, and in doing so, to apply the level of

20. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, art. 4[c], at 4.
21. Id. at art. 3(2), at 5.
22. Id. pmbl.
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23

protection that each considers appropriate.
The textual proposal also mentions a “shared commitment to good
regulatory principles and practices, such as those laid down in the OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Recommendation
24
of 22 March 2012 on Regulatory Policy and Governance.” If this commitment
makes the final text and if the agreement is adopted, this would be the most
formal endorsement of these OECD principles by the EU and the clearest step
toward codification of better regulation principles and tools, such as
transparency, consultation, or impact assessment, which has been signaled as
one “indirect avenue” for “shaping the respective domestic regulatory
25
process.” At the same time, buried in a footnote, but clearly phrased, the EU
maintains that “[t]he provisions as set forth in this Chapter cannot be
interpreted or applied as to oblige either Party to change its fundamental
principles governing regulation in its jurisdiction, for example in the areas of
26
risk assessment and risk management.” The wording of this proposal raises the
question of what sets fundamental principles apart from regular ones. If we are
to read “fundamental principles” as “constitutional principles,” the EC accepts
the possibility of better regulation principles being at odds with the latter.
Concretely, the OECD recommendation includes “net maximization of
benefits” as a principle of good regulation. In many instances this principle is at
odds with the precautionary principle—the idea that scientific uncertainty
should not be a reason to avoid regulating in the public interest—and other
objectives for regulation prioritized at a constitutional level in the EU. The EC
has explicitly pointed to the constitutional entrenchment of the precautionary
27
principle as a reason why this principle cannot be affected by TTIP. Yet as the
precautionary principle already indicates, giving this principle teeth in the daily
practice of EU lawmaking has been difficult. This difficulty makes it hard to
determine whether a different flavor of regulatory analysis as a result of TTIP
will have any impact on the precautionary principle.
3. Regulatory Analysis
The United States and the EU have previously attempted to find common
28
ground in the way they approach the ex ante analysis of regulations. However,
23. Id. at art. 1(d)(3), at 3.
24. Id.
25. Marija Bartl, TTIP’s Regulatory Cooperation Framework and its Democratic Implications,
ACELG BLOG (Feb. 8, 2015), http://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/02/08/ttip%E2%80%99s-regulatorycooperation-framework-and-its-democratic-implications/ (summarizing the contribution by Alberto
Alemanno to the workshop ‘Why TTIP? On its rationale, institutions and substantive areas,” that took
place at the University of Amsterdam on February 17, 2015).
26. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 2 n.2.
27. Karel De Gucht, European Trade Commissioner, Address at the Aspen Institute Prague
Annual Conference: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—Solving the Regulatory
Puzzle (Oct. 10, 2013) (transcript available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc
_151822.pdf). The precautionary principle is codified in Article 191 TFEU, infra note 50.
28. See, e.g., United States European Commission, High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum,
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important dividing lines remain. For example, the United States would like the
EC to make public draft impact assessments so that they can be a basis for
29
consultation, a suggestion the EC regularly dismisses. Similarly, the United
States often asserts the EU system contains too much methodological pluralism
because the EU’s Impact Assessment Guidelines currently allow the official
carrying out the assessment to decide how quantitative the analysis should be
30
and how flexible the decision criteria should be. The EU responds to U.S.
contentions with these issues by pointing out that some legislative initiatives are
ill-suited to narrow economical evaluation, namely cost-benefit analysis,
because of the nature of the problems they seek to address. If the EU has its
way, impact analyses will have to be performed on U.S. federal statutes, which
the EU has proposed to be included in the definition of “regulatory acts at
31
central level”—an unlikely outcome. The EC textual proposal contains some
interesting ideas on how to converge the way analytical tools such as impact
assessment are applied in rulemaking procedures on both sides of the Atlantic;
for instance, by making it obligatory to include information on the relationship
32
between a new regulatory initiative and “relevant international instruments.”
What is not yet addressed in the Commission’s proposal is to what extent
the impact on third-country citizens will be included under the assessment of
trade implications expected to appear more prominently in regulatory analyses
post-TTIP. Inevitably, if two large power blocks like the United States and the
EU enter into regulatory cooperation talks, the results will impact legal systems
not present at the negotiations. This mainly occurs when it comes to the
voluntary adoption or spill-over effects of standards that result from regulatory
33
cooperation on substantive issues. But as regulatory cooperation becomes
proceduralized, meaning that parties defer agreements on regulatory content in
favor of agreement on the procedures such as cost-benefit analysis and risk
assessment through which regulation will be decided, it matters for third
countries whether their interests are accounted for in these procedures.
Regulatory analysis is generally meant to provide a counterweight against
powerful regulatory rent-seekers, but in a bilateral regulatory cooperation
context with multilateral consequences, regulatory analysis could also help

Common
Understanding
on
Regulatory
Principles
and
Best
Practices
(2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/common-understanding-on-regulatoryprinciples-and-best-practices.pdf; Meuwese, supra note 6 (discussing previous efforts).
29. Comments of the United States Government on the 2014 Revision of the European
Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines, Public Consultation Document (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/useu/231771/PDFs/USAresponseIA_final.pdf (referring to the OECD
Recommendation).
30. Commission Staff Working Document on Better Regulation Guidelines, COM (2015) 215 final
(May 19, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf.
31. Dudley & Wegrich, supra note 15.
32. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, art. 7(2) at 7.
33. See, e.g., Pauwelyn, Wessel & Wouters, supra note 10, at 752–53 (explaining the de facto
adoption of standards set by the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use by countries like Brazil or China).
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“address claims of an emerging gap between regulatory jurisdiction and
regulatory impact, which is particularly significant when it comes to the actions
34
of industrialized states.” The Commission mentions in its Better Regulation
35
Guidelines the possibility that EU regulations impact third countries but it is
unclear to what extent this occurs.
4. A Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB)
A final major area of impact on regulatory sovereignty for the EU is the
establishment of new bodies. The published negotiation texts mention a “Joint
36
Ministerial Body” at the political level. Though it is unclear exactly what this
body would do, it could have a role in enforcing the provisions of the regulatory
coherence chapter. Much more detailed are the proposed provisions regarding
the RCB, whose most important task is envisaged to be
the preparation and publication of an Annual Regulatory Co-operation Programme
reflecting common priorities of the Parties and the outcomes of past or ongoing
regulatory cooperation initiatives under section III of this Chapter, including
information on the follow-up, the steps envisaged and timeframes proposed in relation
37
to these identified common priorities.

The RCB would also monitor the implementation of the provisions of the
entire regulatory coherence chapter and report to the Joint Ministerial Body.
Furthermore, it would consider new initiatives for regulatory cooperation “on
the basis of input from either Party or its stakeholders,” prepare initiatives and
38
proposals, ensure transparency, and examine other issues. The RCB and the
Joint Ministerial Body could also create “sectoral working groups” and delegate
certain tasks to them.
Much is unclear regarding the envisaged composition of the RCB, which has
caused outcries from several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that
39
“business will get a direct seat at the table.” The textual proposal implies that

34. Alberto Alemanno, Is There a Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis Beyond the Nation-State?
Lessons from International Regulatory Cooperation, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 113 (Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013)
(regarding the term “external accountability gap”).
35. These guidelines contain information on how Commission Services conduct impact
assessments. A new version of the Guidelines was adopted as part of the Juncker Commission’s “Better
Regulation Package” on May 19, 2015, replacing the Impact Assessment Guidelines.
36. The name “Joint Ministerial Body” does not clearly convey which politicians or officials would
take part, because the term “minister” may not mean the same on both sides of the Atlantic.
37. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 11.
38. Id. Article 14-3 proposes an exception to the central role of the Joint Ministerial Body: “In the
domain of financial services the functions as set out under in paragraph 2 shall be performed by the
[Joint EU/US Financial Regulatory Forum (FRF)], which shall ensure appropriate information to the
RCB.”
39. To cite one illustrative concern that does not appear to have much basis in the EU’s textual
proposals: “The Commissioner wants to farm out the formulation of new regulations and laws to a sort
of ‘Secret Council’ composed of those with a direct interest . . . Who would sit on that body isn’t clear . .
. .” TTIP ‘Secret Council’ Neither Democratic nor Transparent, DUTCH SOCIALIST PARTY (Feb. 10,
2015),
http://international.sp.nl/news/2015/02/ttip-secret-council-neither-democratic-nor-transparent
(quoting Anne-Marie Mineur).
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the RCB will not receive a stakeholder platform along the lines of the EU’s
High Level Working Group on Administrative Burdens. Rather, the provision
mentions that the RCB “shall be composed of representatives of both Parties.”
Given that elsewhere in the text the Parties and “its stakeholders” are so clearly
distinguished, it appears unlikely that a stakeholder could be a representative.
However, the next sentence, “It shall be co-chaired by senior representatives of
regulators and competent authorities, regulatory coordination activities and
international trade matters,” appears to leave some room for members from
outside the respective administrations if regulatory coordination activities
include platforms such as the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue and the
40
Transatlantic Business Dialogue. An annual stakeholder meeting with the
purpose of exchanging views on the Annual Regulatory Cooperation Program
is also proposed, to “be prepared jointly by the co-chairs of the RCB and which
shall involve [] the co-chairs of the Civil Society Contact Groups, including a
balanced representation of business, consumers, trade unions, environmental
41
groups and other relevant public interest associations . . . .” The Commission’s
proposal repeatedly states that “[t]he RCB will not have the power to: adopt
42
legal acts” or “interfere with any domestic EU or US regulatory procedures.”
It appears that two points will be of crucial importance for the constitutional
implications of this novel tool for horizontal regulatory cooperation. First, the
RCB’s interaction with the political Joint Ministerial Body is critical because
the permanent status of the RCB may be instrumental in suppressing the
tendency within many more political bodies to let activities take place in
negotiation mode. Although, if the Joint Ministerial Body receives a heavy role
in resolving disagreements, politicization will dominate. Second, the extent to
which the RCB will manage to operate in a transparent manner remains critical.
As the Commission has stated, the RCB would exist to share knowledge, not to
43
make decisions in any formal sense. But how and with whom this knowledge is
shared will be the crucial question, especially if representation by the member
states is lacking. A fundamental difference between the EU’s constitutional
structure and that of the United States, after all, is that the EU institutions do
not represent a comprehensive federation of states.
B. Implications for Democratic Accountability
1. Democratic control and institutional balance
Many of the issues of democratic accountability arising from horizontal

40. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 12.
41. Id. Article 15-2 states that “[p]articipation of stakeholders shall not be conditional on them
being directly affected by the items on the agenda of each meeting.” Id.
42. EUROPEAN COMM’N, Introduction to the EU Legal Text on Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP 2
(2015). Article 14-2(c) repeats “[t]he RCB will not have the power to adopt legal acts.” Id. at 11.
43. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 42 (“A joint body would act as a forum to share ideas and
plan cooperation on new technologies and risks and our regulatory responses to them. The body would
provide a forum for exchanges between regulators on these types of questions.”).
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regulatory cooperation are similar to the constitutional concerns associated with
44
networked governance in general. Dutch Members of Parliament tabled a
motion asking the Dutch government to promote the exclusion of regulatory
cooperation from the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and
TTIP trade agreements. They based this on their observation that these treaties
may stipulate mandatory stakeholder consultation, which in their opinion is a
45
violation of the democratic decisionmaking process. Interestingly, mistaken
46
translation—pointed out by the Minister of Trade herself —of “businesses”
47
instead of “stakeholders” in an earlier version of the motion reveal its main
underlying worry: regulatory capture by powerful and wealthy companies. The
48
motion was not adopted by the Parliament.
Hesitation regarding open forms of consultation, in which the participants
are not pre-selected or filtered in any way and which thereby may give an unfair
advantage to those with the greatest resources, exist in continental Europe
among several political circles. The most alarming messages come from circles
that are skeptical of globalization, but the more moderate alarmists have plenty
to say on the matter as well:
This process will take place outside the regular democratic decision-making processes
on both sides of the Atlantic, preventing national parliaments and locally elected
bodies from being fully involved, and dangerously limiting the public debate. Good
ideas for regulation in the public
interest could be stopped before they are even
49
discussed by an elected body.

This sort of statement boils down to a complaint that the European
50
Parliament has long had about EU lawmaking in general. The Commission’s
textual proposal contains a placeholder for interaction with legislative bodies,
51
no doubt because it is one of the trickiest issues. The possible implications for

44. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks Accountable,
in PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 522–25.
45. Tweede Kamer [Dutch Parliament, Second Chamber], 21501-02, no. 1438 (2014–15),
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1438.html.
46. Tweede Kamer [Dutch Parliament, Second Chamber], 21501-02, Reports (Handelingen) no. 26
(2014–15), https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20142015-26-8.html.
47. Tweede Kamer [Dutch Parliament, Second Chamber], 21501-02, no. 1432 (2014–15),
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1432.html.
48. Tweede Kamer [Dutch Parliament, Second Chamber], 21501-02, Reports (Handelingen) no. 21
(2014–15),
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/handelingen/TK/2014-2015/28/h-tk-20142015-2821?resultIndex=12&sorttype=1&sortorder=4.
49. Corporate Europe Observatory, TTIP: Covert Attacks on Democracy and Regulation 1–2
(2014), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/ttip_covert_attacks.pdf.
50. The European Parliament is involved in the TTIP negotiations, which are not discussed
extensively here because the focus of this article is on what will happen if TTIP is adopted. See
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 207(3) & art.
218(10), Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) [hereinafter TFEU] (information gathering). The Commission
is obliged to report to the European Parliament on progress. See Frank Hoffmeister, The Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements of the European Union: Concept and Challenges, in TRADE
LIBERALISATION AND STANDARDISATION—NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE ‘LOW POLITICS’ OF EU
FOREIGN POLICY 19 (Marise Cremona & Tamara Takács eds., 2014).
51. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 14.
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the institutional balance are plentiful: Will de facto regulatory authority migrate
to a transatlantic forum of executive governance? And will it cease to be based
on EU primary law? As the current textual proposals stand, it is quite likely
that the executive branch, comprised of the Commission, will gain power at the
expense of the legislature, the European Parliament or Council.
2. Multilevel Aspects
Much is still unknown about the extent to which lower levels of regulatory
decisionmaking in the EU—member states or even regional and local levels—
will be included in the regulatory coherence chapter. The text from December
23, 2014 includes the following wording:
“[R]egulators and competent authorities at non-central level” means:
i. For the EU, the national authorities of an EU Member State responsible for the
preparation of regulatory acts at non-central level;
ii. For the US, the authorities at State level responsible for the preparation of
52
regulatory acts at non-central level.

In the text from January 23, 2015, that provision had been eliminated and
the following wording had been added to the general notes section:
This draft covers regulatory acts at“‘central” level, understood as EU-level and US
Federal acts. However, the draft also envisages the possibility to discuss, upon request,
on other regulatory acts, in particular, those adopted by the central national
authorities of EU Member States or by US States. Cooperation on those other
regulatory acts may need to be addressed further, in order to achieve the objective of
enhancing regulatory cooperation, including in light of the discussions in particular
in
53
sectors. The EU reserves the possibility of tabling specific proposals in this regard.

In the published version of February 10, 2015, the wording of the general
note has been changed to:
[I]n particular, this draft covers regulatory acts at “central” level, understood as EUlevel and US Federal acts. It includes also placeholders for regulatory acts of US
States and of the central national authorities of EU Member States, which will be
covered in a revised version of this draft chapter in order to provide a balanced and
comprehensive coverage of relevant regulations.54

Ideas to include municipalities and regional authorities, which would further
complicate the definition of regulation and possibly broaden the scope of
regulatory cooperation, were taken off the agenda conclusively when the EC
55
published its proposal for a definition on “non-central” acts.
3. Transparency and a “Right to Lobby”?
Participation and dialogue have been part of transatlantic regulatory
52. Initial Provisions for TTIP Chapter [ ] on Regulatory Cooperation 1 (Dec. 23, 2014)
[hereinafter December Initial Provisions], http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/231214_
regulatory_coherence_draft_proposal.pdf.
53. Initial Provisions for TTIP Chapter [ ] on Regulatory Cooperation 1 (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ttip-eu-regulatory-coherence-draft-proposal23.01.15.pdf.
54. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 1.
55. See December Initial Provisions, supra note 51.
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56

cooperation from the beginning, but TTIP has drawn a lot of attention to the
57
phenomenon. The “right to lobby,” a phrase coined by NGOs that despise
TTIP, describes the alleged ambition of certain business stakeholders to
58
“essentially co-write regulation.” The worry is that “transatlantic regulation
might in the near future be more shaped by political leaders, rent-seeking
59
interest groups, and legislators than by networks of technocrats.” But how
much access do stakeholders such as businesses and NGOs get under the
Commission’s proposal? Article 6 on stakeholder consultations addresses the
extent of this access:
When preparing regulatory acts at central level undergoing impact assessment, the
regulating Party shall offer a reasonable opportunity for any interested natural or legal
person, on a non-discriminatory basis, to provide input through a public consultation
process, and shall take into account the contributions received in the finalisation of
their regulatory acts. The regulating Party should make use of electronic means60 of
communication and seek to use dedicated single access webportals, where possible.

Here, the main point of contention between the EU and the United States is
not so much about the degree of access as it is about timing and transparency.
The U.S. input for the public consultation on the Commission’s consultation
guidelines—which is unrelated to TTIP but gives a good idea of the U.S.
position on this issue—demonstrated that having draft impact assessments
61
available to contextualize stakeholder input is important to the United States.
On this point the EC has recently given in somewhat to the United States—
formally outside of the TTIP context—by announcing that it will start
62
publishing “inception impact assessments.”
56. See Tamara Takács, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation in Trade: Objectives, Challenges and
Instruments of Economic Governance, in A TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY OF LAW: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND U.S. LEGAL ORDERS 175 (Elaine
Fahey & Deirdre Curtin eds., 2014) (giving an overview of different mechanisms).
57. Corporate Europe Observatory, supra note 49, at 4.
58. The allegation is based on this document placed on its website by an anti–TTIP NGO: U.S.
Chamber of Commerce & BUSINESSEUROPE, Regulatory Cooperation in the EU–US Economic
Agreement (Oct. 2012), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/businesseurope-uschamberpaper.pdf.
59. Lütz, supra note 4.
60. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 5.
61. Comments of the United States Government on the European Commission’s Public
Consultation Document for Stakeholder Consultation Guidelines 2014 (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/useu/231771/PDFs/USresponseConsultGuidelinesfinal.pdf; see also
Shawn Donnan, U.S. Pushes for Greater Transparency in EU Business Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 23,
2014,
12:03
PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6e9b7190-9a65-11e3-8e06-00144feab7de.html#axzz
3VXHWBQIB.
62. European Commission, Better Regulation for Better Results—an EU Agenda(May 19 2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_regulation/documents/com_2015_215_en.pdf. All the Initial
Provisions mention on the subject is:
Article 5—Early information on planned acts
1. Each Party shall make publicly available at least once a year a list of planned regulatory
acts at central level, providing information on their respective scope and objectives.
2. For planned regulatory acts at central level undergoing impact assessment each Party shall
make publicly available, as early as possible, information on planning and timing leading to
their adoption, including on planned stakeholder consultations and potential for significant
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III
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF REGULATORY COHERENCE IN TTIP
When the negotiation documents do consider constitutional aspects of the
regulatory coherence chapter, they focus on the possibility that TTIP would
undermine the EU treaties or member state constitutions that lay down the
right of governments to make laws and regulations in the public interest—and
63
reassure that this will not be the case. This part argues that the treaties and
Constitutions involved are not only something “not to undermine,” but they are
something for TTIP to actively involve. The limitations discussed below are
relevant to TTIP, even quite apart from the question of what a court would do
with these limitations after TTIP’s adoption.
The following addresses the principle of conferral, the constitutional
limitations regarding regulatory objectives and principles, and the exclusive
right of initiative of the European Commission. Subsequently, the democraticaccountability issues of delegation and participation are discussed.
A. Limitations regarding Regulatory Sovereignty
1. The Principle of Conferral
The regulatory powers of the EU are defined vis-à-vis the member states.
64
The principle of conferral means that the EU cannot legislate or regulate
without explicit conferral by the member states. Powers not conferred on the
EU remain with the member states. The assumption is that whatever the
internal distribution of powers between the EU and the member states,
together they are sovereign. That is, it is assumed that the EU and member
states jointly have the exclusive power to regulate within their territory. Third
parties de facto influencing the EU or member-state enactment of legislation or
regulations simply do not fall within this scheme. This understanding of
regulatory sovereignty means that for full coverage of possible regulatory trade
barriers to appear on the radar, regulatory acts at the non-central level would
have to be included, because there is no way for the EU to acquire new
legislative (and thereby regulatory) powers without treaty revision. This in turn
would make it very difficult for the Commission to stave off claims that TTIP is
65
a “mixed agreement,” which means that the member states are co-signatories.
2. Regulatory Objectives and Principles
Which principles, provisions, and case law limit the EU legislator’s capacity
impacts on trade or investment.
Initial Provisions, supra note 5, art. 5.
63. Initial Provisions, supra note 5, art. 1(d)(3) at 3.
64. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 4-1 & 5-2, 992 O.J. (C224) 1,
(signed at Maastricht), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU].
65. Letter from Maroš Šefovi, Vice President, European Commission, to Presidents and Chairmen
of European Commission (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/
download/082dbcc54c03415b014c09447e0904f0.do.
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to curtail its own regulatory leeway? This section focuses on the EC, selfappointed as the regulator in the published negotiation text at the central level
in the EU. In stating that “neither side is going to renounce the right to regulate
66
in [the] future to reach the level of protection that their citizens choose,” the
EC ignores that constitutional and self-regulatory limitations on its regulatory
sovereignty already exist.
Much literature on comparative regulatory studies discusses diverging
regulatory philosophies on either side of the Atlantic. There are constitutional
aspects to these philosophies, even apart from the issue of the precautionary
principle, in the sense that the Treaty prescribes certain regulatory goals:
Article 3 of the TEU lists the general objectives of the Union, which include
“balanced economic growth and price stability,” “a highly competitive social
market economy,” “full employment and social progress,” and “a high level of
67
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.” Additionally,
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union mentions more specific
regulatory goals, such as “developing a coordinated strategy for employment
and particularly for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and
68
labor markets responsive to economic change” and “the promotion of
69
employment, improved living and working conditions.” The codification of
these regulatory objectives in the Treaty in combination with the
aforementioned principle of conferral means that these expressions of EU
regulatory philosophies are not mere public policy objectives subject to change
with the political tide, but constitutionally entrenched directions and limitations
for regulation.
3. The Commission’s Right of Initiative
The Commission enjoys the exclusive right of initiative in the legislative
context at the EU level, which means that no other institution may put forward
a legislative proposal. The European Parliament can try to press the
Commission through the adoption of resolutions, but it does not share the
constitutional right of initiative.
One major constitutional issue to consider is to what extent the EC can limit
itself in the exercise of its legislative right of initiative. This is relevant to the
TTIP regulatory coherence chapter because committing to a certain type of
consultation procedure as standard practice may imply such a limitation. The
66. Karel De Gucht, European Trade Commissioner, Address at the Aspen Institute Prague
Annual Conference: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—Solving the Regulatory
Puzzle (Oct. 10, 2013) (transcript available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/
october/tradoc_151822.pdf). The precautionary principle is codified in TFEU art. 191.
67. TEU art. 3.
68. TFEU art. 145.
69. TFEU art. 151. Other examples include culture (Title XIII), Public Health (Title XIV),
Consumer Protection (Title XV), and Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion (Title XVIII). See
also Initial Provisions, supra note 5, at 2 (“[T]he environment; consumers; public health; working
conditions; social protection and social security; human, animal and plant life; animal welfare; health
and safety; personal data; cybersecurity; cultural diversity; and preserving financial stability.”).
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relevant case law originates from previous attempts at horizontal regulatory
cooperation between the United States and the EU. In 2004, the European
Court of Justice (CJEU) decided a case in which France challenged the legality
70
of the Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency. It held that
instruments of regulatory cooperation between the EU and the United States
have to respect underlying principles of the division of powers, institutional
71
balance, and the need an adequate legal basis. In this case, these limitations
did not result in annulment of the Guidelines. The Court instead accepted the
Commission’s argument that the right of initiative includes the ability to hold
any consultations it considers necessary; and further, that this does not amount
to an infringement of the Commission’s sole right to initiate legislation, as
72
France had argued. The argument endorsed by the Advocate-General is that
when the Commission concludes arrangements to steer the consultation along
particular defined paths, it is exercising rather than restricting its right of
initiative. The Advocate-General ended his opinion with an emphasis on the
“duty to discuss the effects of any rules envisaged with American trading
partners before such rules are proposed to the European legislature,” which
preempts any conclusion that there is an infringement of the Commission’s right
73
of initiative.
The EU system for the protection of fundamental rights, specifically the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, is a further limitation
on the European legislator’s space to regulate—and thus indirectly the agendasetting power of the RCB. One example of a concrete limitation is Article 8(3)
of the Charter, which requires that personal data be retained by an independent
authority. One of the reasons the CJEU repealed the EU Data Retention
Directive was that it did not require the data in question to be retained within
the EU. Without such a localization obligation, the Court has reasoned, an
essential component of the protection of individuals regarding the processing of
74
personal data remained unfulfilled. This illustrates that the Charter contains
built-in restrictions on the content of EU legislation. The proposed approach to
regulatory coherence in TTIP risks setting up the assessment of trade impacts of
regulation as a track separate from regular regulatory scrutiny and thus
overlooking the fundamental rights component.

70. Case 233/02, French Republic v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 2004 E.C.R. I-2759.
71. Id.
72. There is only one other EU case directly concerning regulatory cooperation that dealt with the
Council’s exclusive competence to conclude international agreements. See Case 327/91, France v.
Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. I-3641.
73. Case C-233/02, French Republic v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 2003 E.C.R. I-2762
(opinion of Advocate-General Alber).
74. Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’n, Marine and Nat. Res.,
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Commissioner of the Garda Siochána, Ireland, The
Attorney Gen., and Irish Human Rights Comm’n, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Apr. 8, 2014).
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B. Limitations regarding Democratic Accountability
The EU’s commitment to democracy runs through the text of both EU
treaties, starting with the preambles, Article 2 TEU, and the provisions on the
legislative procedure and the citizens’ initiative. The EU constitutional
framework contains elements of parliamentary, deliberative, participatory, and
75
multilevel democracy.
1. Delegation
One strand of constitutional limitations concerns the leeway for delegating
legislative power to bodies that are not mentioned in the treaties—the TEU and
the TFEU. The treaties are silent on the establishment of agencies and
networks. Agencies are usually established by secondary law on the basis of a
specific treaty provision. Cooperative bodies producing nonbinding regulation
are common in the EU; for example, the Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party, which is a body of the European Commission that unites all national
76
“data protection watchdogs” and is the European data protection supervisor.
Many recent developments in producing EU regulation have occurred in the
area of delegated lawmaking due to the changes brought about by the Lisbon
77
78
Treaty in 2009. However, what goes into primary legislation and rulemaking
is not always clear nor logical nor parallel to the U.S. system. A further problem
pertains to the high level of unpredictability surrounding the choice between
delegated acts and implementing measures and the resulting regulatory
procedure. In 2014 the European Commission brought an action for annulment
before the CJEU, arguing that the biocides regulation should have been a
79
formal delegated act and not just an implementing measure. The two types of
EU rulemaking represent mutually exclusive categories, or so the Commission
argued. The European Parliament and Council won the day, however, when the
Court, curiously referring to the Constitutional Treaty, which was never
adopted, allowed for a certain amount of discretion on the part of the
80
legislature.
75. TEU, arts. 9–12; see also TEU art. 21:
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the
wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity,
and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.
76. For
additional
information
on
the
Article
29
Working
Party
see
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/index_en.htm.
77. C. Boyden Gray, Upgrading Existing Regulatory Mechanisms for Transatlantic Regulatory
Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 35 (“[D]elegated acts present a vehicle for
increased accountability and transparency as well as systematic consideration of transatlantic economic
effects. Increasing transparency, accountability, and stakeholder participation in the EC’s development
of proposed regulations and directives, however, remains even more important to achieving the shared
objective of transatlantic regulatory compatibility.”).
78. “Non-legislative acts” in EU legal jargon.
79. Case C-427/12, 18 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:170.
80. Id.
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In some U.S. case law, delegation of government authority to a private
entity and a nongovernmental arbitrator has been deemed unconstitutional
“because such a delegation gave those entities ‘an effective veto’ over
81
government action.” Comparable case law in the EU is lacking, because the
constitutional limits formulated by the CJEU over the past decades have been
so strict as to prevent attempts to delegate regulatory authority to private
82
entities altogether. In its Meroni judgment, the CJEU established that the
delegation of powers must be confined to a clearly defined executive power and
may not involve a wide range of discretion. Consequently, the delegation of
general rule-making powers to agencies is forbidden. In its recent judgment, the
CJEU loosened these criteria by accepting that the European Securities and
Markets Authority instead of the EC has the power to draft technical rules if
83
the legislative framework is sufficiently detailed. Given the clear requirement
of a detailed legislative framework, this case does not directly open any door to
de-facto delegation to an RCB, but it does show that the EU constitutional
framework is more susceptible to delegation of regulatory powers as a matter of
degree rather than kind.
2. Participation
Participation and transparency norms, as directly applicable, foundational,
and democratic principles upon which the EU is founded, were codified in the
84
Lisbon Treaty. Further, these principles have become operationalized through
a myriad of specific procedures. When examined in light of EU receptiveness to
international standards, precisely the procedural rules meant to give effect to
constitutional norms regarding openness and participation are at risk of being
85
bypassed for lack strong constitutional entrenchment. This situation is at odds
with the promotion of “good global governance,” which—inherently vague as it
86
may be—is an objective of the EU external policy. The most tangible
protection for participation in a legislative or regulatory context consists of soft
law: The Commission’s Minimum Standards on Consultation, which are not
judicially enforceable in any way. EU constitutional protections are weak in the
area of participation. This may also mean that the TTIP’s regulatory coherence
chapter has a large role to play as a catalyst for affecting EU decisionmaking.

81. See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
735 (citing Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2013)) (giving an
overview of judicial review of regulatory cooperation efforts by U.S. agencies).
82. Case 9-56, Meroni v. High Authority, 1958 E.C.R. [133].
83. Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, [2014] E.C.R. I___ (delivered
January 22, 2014).
84. See TEU arts. 10(3), 11; see also TFEU arts. 15(1), 298(1).
85. Joana Mendes, EU Law and Global Regulatory Regimes: Hollowing Out Procedural
Standards?, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 988, 1010 (2012).
86. TEU. art. 21(2)(h).
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IV
CONCLUSION
The idea behind the current set of proposals on horizontal regulatory
cooperation within TTIP is that constitutional implications will be minimal and
therefore the constitutional limitations need not be invoked: “Once TTIP is
adopted, regulatory cooperation will not change the way each side makes
regulation. Both sides are expected to exercise transparency toward each other
and to the public in making known their regulatory intentions. This will support
more informative interaction among regulators and promote better regulatory
87
outcomes.”
This article demonstrates that even if few direct changes to fundamental
aspects of EU legislative and regulatory decisionmaking are embedded in the
most recent drafts of TTIP, the drafts’ various implications for regulatory
sovereignty and democratic accountability have constitutional implications. On
the one hand, TTIP does not formally alter the parties’ adoption procedures for
legislation and rules; there is no intention to amend the EU or U.S.
constitutional systems or to craft joint decision-making power. On the other
hand, in practice, TTIP may erode the Commission’s right to initiate legislation
because the case law on horizontal regulatory cooperation actually encourages
concluding agreements that dictate how to consult on and analyze regulatory
initiatives. The analysis also illustrates how many of the potential erosions and
limitations of regulatory sovereignty and democratic accountability are actually
self-inflicted on the part of the EC.
Is the Commission still free in the definition and content of legislative
measures? On this point, the EU treaties heavily regulate this space due to the
principle of conferral and the inclusion of regulatory objectives and principles
such as the precautionary principle. The proposed additional institutional
structures will likely increase regulators’ awareness of the extraterritorial
impact of their decisions for they imply additional analysis in this regard. The
RCB and working groups will provide a forum in which regulators can discuss
all sorts of regulations and their implementation. There are certainly
advantages to this socialization because “[TTIP] will counter the litigious and
confrontational culture of the WTO, where the EU and the USA find
88
themselves typically as rivals and antagonists.” However, the resulting de facto
deference to transnational experts calls for constitutional regulation.
Can the EU constitutional framework regulate horizontal regulatory
cooperation with the United States? The planned regulatory coherence chapter
has a unique role in TTIP. One might describe it as one large placeholder in the
entire agreement. Specific regulatory approximations that cannot be agreed
upon during the negotiations as well as future regulatory initiatives are
87. OVERVIEW, supra note 16, at 7.
88. Joseph Weiler, Editorial, The International Society for Public Law—Call for Papers and
Panels; Van Gend en Loos—50th Anniversary; Vital Statistics; Roll of Honour; Quantitative Empirical
International Legal Scholarship in this Issue, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 961, 963 (2014).
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subjected to a horizontal cooperative mechanism. This is in line with the idea
that TTIP should be a “living agreement,” but it also makes regulatory
cooperation, as approached procedurally, particularly difficult for constitutional
arrangements to regulate.
A major issue to be solved in the negotiations is whether to include primary
legislation, such as statutes and legislative acts, as well as non-central
legislation, such as member state laws and regulations. It remains to be seen if
the new inception impact assessments do enough to meet the U.S. demand for
an increase in timely transparency for the preparation of legislative and
regulatory acts. No case law concludes that committing to early publication of
draft impact assessments would constitute a violation of the Commission’s right
of initiative. This may be different if horizontal regulatory cooperation develops
to include substantive decision criteria at odds with the limitative regulatory
objectives in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The largest
implications concern the institutional apparatus envisaged. Here, the EU
constitutional framework lacks the tools to regulate socialization of regulatory
actors involved.
Given the constitutional framework that deals with competence in a fairly
formalistic way, and given the uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of the
horizontal regulatory provisions in particular, it is worth considering how the
EU constitutional framework could be strengthened to better handle structural,
89
horizontal regulatory cooperation. Because the institutional aspect of EU law
is under siege by the demands of practical problem solving, namely the
economic need for regulatory cooperation, constitutional law should aim to
regulate the risk that voluntary convergence de facto turns into circumvention
of the properly competent legislative or regulatory bodies. Some of these bodies
themselves are involved, although as of yet it is not clear which sub-bodies will
be active in regulatory exchanges. For instance, will the concrete actors have a
trade background? Or will they be regulators—a word that the EU textual
proposal uses frequently?
In search of solutions for the lack of clarity regarding the actual impact of
horizontal regulatory cooperation in TTIP, it may be useful to view the risks
associated with the establishment of an RCB or equivalent body as an
information problem and not as a sovereignty problem in the first instance. The
Trade Commissioner has argued that “[a]mbitious regulatory cooperation helps
90
us make better decisions because regulators can share expertise and data.”
Because the European Commission clearly frames the institutional advantages
of TTIP in terms of information exchange, it can be called upon to ground such
89. Bengt Jacobsson, Regulated Regulators: Global Trends of State Transformation, in
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 205–24 (Marie-Laure
Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006); Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional
Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 1 (2011).
90. Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Trade, Address at Berlin–SPD Conference:
Transatlantic Free Trade Opportunities and Risks, TTIP: Freedom and Responsibility 3 (Feb. 23,
2015).
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sharing of regulatory and other data in sound procedures. Handling regulatory
information in such a way that it increases accountability is not self-evident. For
example, the former Impact Assessment Board has poor track record in user
friendliness—its opinions can only be found in a non-searchable specialized
system rather than the regular legislative databases. For the regulatory
coherence chapter in TTIP this means that the EC should propose more than
91
public accessibility of RCB meeting agendas. Designing structures to optimize
in the interest of citizens, information, and best-practices exchange is one of the
92
urgent challenges for contemporary public law, and a challenge for which
93
regulatory cooperation efforts have an opportunity to be at the forefront. In
the EU context there have been some efforts at recognizing the centrality of
data or information in the exercise of public power. For example, the Research
Network on EU Administrative Law, an academic, administrative law
codification project, has devoted two books to mutual assistance between
94
administrative bodies and administrative information management.
Perhaps democratically elected bodies on both sides of the Atlantic can take
some inspiration from the influence on European decisionmaking that national
parliaments gained over the years. Once deemed impossible, many EU national
parliaments now have some degree of direct influence on what their
government minister is deciding in the EU Council of Ministers. All of the
mechanisms established to facilitate this newly won influence, such as
obligatory information notes (impact fiches) and the so-called yellow card that
allows a collectivity of national parliaments to force the EC to reconsider a
legislative proposal, are information based. Now that the European Parliament
and the member states have become more involved through the Council with
the Commission’s work program, perhaps they should strive to do the same
with the Annual Regulatory Cooperation Program.
But the information streams should also be regulated to engage and protect
citizens. If the Commission is serious about keeping corporate influence over
legislation at bay, it should commit to increased transparency. Part of the
implementation phase of regulatory coherence within TTIP—provided that this
treaty ever enters into force—will necessarily remain obscured. What is being
discussed in regulatory exchanges and RCB meetings will be extremely difficult
91. Initial Provisions, supra note 13, at 12 (“[A]genda and the minutes of the meetings of the RCB
shall be made public.”).
92. See generally Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values,
17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory
Governance: Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211 (2014).
93. See generally Kai Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory
Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387 (2000) (explaining the link between a good regulatory
architecture and compliance in a regulatory cooperation context).
94. Inspired by the American “restatement” approach, this project put forward model rules
“designed as a draft proposal for binding legislation identifying—on the basis of comparative
research—best practices in different specific policies of the EU, in order to reinforce general principles
of EU law.” See Publications, RENEUAL, http://www.reneual.eu/publications/main_publications.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
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or impossible to make visible—absent in-depth empirical research. Exploring
how involved regulators will deal with the accountability–independence
dilemma—that they will need on the one hand a sufficient degree of
accountability toward their domestic constituencies, while on the other hand, a
sufficient degree of mutual trust that they do not arrive to the dialogue table
with the exclusive aim of representing their domestic stakeholders and voters—
provides a potential research agenda for both socio-legal and public-law
scholars.

